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FIRST AMENDMENT COMMERCIAL SPEECH
PROTECTIONS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE
Bruce E.H. Johnson*
When the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the
appeal in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, legal experts and pundits predicted the
Court would use the case to redefine the commercial speech
doctrine.2 The Court's ruling failed to meet these expectations.'
After conducting oral argument, the Court in a 5-4 per curiam order
dismissed the writ of certiorari as "improvidently granted. 4  The
dismissal left standing a highly criticized California Supreme Court
decision that formulated a broad three-part test for identifying
commercial speech.5 The test potentially sweeps the greater part of
corporate communications into the definition of "commercial
speech"-a category of speech that receives less First Amendment
protection.6
* Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP. The author would like to thank Sarah Duran, an
associate at Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, and Megan Vogel, a summer associate at Davis Wright
Tremaine LLP, for their assistance with this article.
1. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099, 1100 (2003).
2. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Landmark Free-Speech Case
That Wasn't: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 965, 966, 1012 (2004); Tony
Mauro, Justices Get Nike Out of Their Hair-For Now, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER ONLINE,
June 27, 2003, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=l 1653.
3. See Collins & Skover, supra note 2, at 966.
4. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003).
5. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 255-56 (Cal. 2002).
6. See id. at 247. The impact of the California decision may be even broader. Many of
Nike's dissenters were opposed to freedom of speech by corporations-not activists, or unions, or
others. Indeed, Kasky himself rejected Nike's effort to invoke First Amendment case law relating
to labor disputes as precedent in its favor. Brief of Respondent at 43, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 45
P.3d 243 (No. 02-575) (Cal. Apr. 4, 2003). Recently, however, a federal court in Virginia
extended the California Supreme Court's holding in order to strip a union of its First Amendment
protections during an organizing campaign. See Aitken v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 496 F.
Supp. 2d 653, 665 (E.D. Va. 2007). Thus, the uncertainties of commercial speech law make it a
dangerous tool in the hands of ideological opponents of any speaker-a risk that Judge Kozinski
and Professor Banner warned about many years ago when they noted that the arbitrariness of
current "commercial speech" doctrine "gives government a powerful weapon to suppress or
control speech by classifying it as merely commercial." Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Wo's
Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 653 (1990).
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Because the Court failed to reach the merits, the line separating
commercial and noncommercial speech-the essential question
raised in Nike-remains amorphous and elusive.7  As a practical
matter, the courts are far from consistent in deciding when
expression satisfies the definition of commercial speech.8
I. NIKE AND THE PROBLEMS WITH
THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S COMMERCIAL SPEECH TEST
In many ways, Nike was an anomaly. The plaintiff, Marc
Kasky, alleged that Nike, a corporation, made false statements in
defending itself from public attacks on its labor practices.9 Nike's
statements, made in response to public criticism, included claims that
Nike's workers in Southeast Asia were protected from physical and
sexual abuse, that Nike paid its workers in accordance with local
laws and regulations governing wages and hours, and that its workers
received a "living wage."1  These statements were distributed in
press releases, letters to newspapers, a letter to university presidents
and athletic directors, and other documents distributed for public
relations purposes.1' Even though Kasky never purchased Nike's
shoes, he sued Nike under California's unfair competition law and
false advertising law.'2 Because claims under these laws could only
be brought if the communication at issue was commercial speech, the
key issue was whether Nike's allegedly false statements should be
categorized as commercial speech or noncommercial speech. 3
The intermediate appellate court in California dismissed
Kasky's complaint after concluding that Nike's statements were
noncommercial speech protected by the California and U.S.
7. Nike, 45 P.3d at 279 (Brown, J., dissenting).
8. See, e.g., Deborah J. La Fetra, Kick it Up a Notch: First Amendment Protection for
Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1205, 1206-07 (2004) (explaining the ways in
which the Supreme Court's inconsistent approach to commercial speech protection has led to
confusion in lower courts); Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and
an Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 613, 632 (2006)
(discussing the vagueness and inconsistencies in the commercial speech test).
9. Nike, 45 P.3d at 247.
10. Id. at 248.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 247.
13. Id.
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Constitutions. 4 The California Supreme Court reversed.'5 In doing
so, the court articulated a three-part test for determining whether
statements constituted commercial speech. 6 The court stated that the
test applies "when a court must decide whether particular speech
may be subjected to laws aimed at preventing false advertising or
other forms of commercial deception."'
7
The California court's test turns on three elements: (1) the
speaker; (2) the intended audience; and (3) the content of the
message.'8 The speaker element is met when the speaker is "likely to
be someone engaged in commerce" or "someone acting on behalf of
a person so engaged." 9  The audience element is satisfied if the
intended audience is "likely to be actual or potential buyers or
customers of the speaker's goods or services, or persons acting for
actual or potential buyers or customers.1 2' The content-of-the-
message element is met if the "speech consists of representations of
fact about the business operations, products, or services of the
speaker (or the individual or company that the speaker represents),
made for the purpose of promoting sales of, or other commercial
transactions in, the speaker's products or services."'2' The California
court's three-part test for commercial speech is so broad that,
practically speaking, any statement made by a commercial entity
concerning itself, its products, or its services that would likely be
heard or repeated to potential customers, can qualify as commercial
speech.22 As a result, such speech receives less First Amendment
protection, and companies are more vulnerable to claims of unfair
competition and other torts.23
14. Id. at 249.
15. Id. at 262.
16. Id. at 256.





22. See id. at 272 (Brown, J., dissenting).
23. Mary Baty, Note, Silencing Corporate Speakers: The California Supreme Court's Broad
New Definition of Commercial Speech Goes Unchecked, 30 J. CORP. L. 141, 158-59 (2004)
(discussing how the California Supreme Court test encompasses almost all corporate speech,
leading to broad corporate liability).
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A number of factors made Nike an unusual commercial speech
case at the Supreme Court level. The prior commercial speech cases
that had reached the Court involved either government attempts to
regulate advertising speech aimed at the public, such as in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,24 or challenges to disciplinary proceedings related to advertising
by regulated businesses, such as in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.25
Thus, both cases pitted a private person against a state entity. .26
Nike introduced a new emphasis because it involved two private
parties-Marc Kasky and Nike, Inc.-in a lawsuit that turned on
whether the speech in question was or was not commercial speech. 7
If it was not commercial speech, Kasky had no cause of action; if it
was commercial speech, the prospects for an individual or entity to
litigate this issue were multi-dimensional, raising many uncertain
issues.28
Nike was unusual for other reasons as well. First, California
laws at that time allowed plaintiffs to sue without having any real
damages and without having conducted any transaction with the
commercial defendant.29 Consequently, commercial entities faced
almost unlimited liability.3" Second, the California case law, as it
stood at the time, allowed for strict liability, rather than actual malice
or falsehood as the fault standard.3 Third, the level of protection
allotted to the speech did not turn on the truth or falsity of the
statements in question, but on whether those statements were
misleading.32  Nike presented the new question of what was
considered "misleading" in a non-transactional setting where the
24. 425 U.S. 748, 749-50 (1976).
25. 433 U.S. 350, 355-56(1977).
26. Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 753 (suit brought by a Virginia resident who suffered from
diseases); Bates, 433 U.S. at 353-54 (suit brought by two licensed attorneys who advertised low-
cost legal services).
27. Nike, 45 P.3d at 247.
28. See id. at 247-48.
29. See id. at 249-50.
30. See, e.g., Baty, supra note 23, at 158; Developments in the Law-Corporations and
Society, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2169, 2274 (2004).
31. Nike, 45 P.3d at 269 (Brown, J., dissenting); see also id. at 261 (majority opinion)
(discussing noncommercial standards).
32. Id. at 262.
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plaintiff did not purchase the product.33 Finally, the statements at
issue came primarily from press releases, 3" which are
communications to the media, rather than advertisements, fliers, and
promotional materials aimed at and distributed to the public, which
were at issue in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.5 Because
Kasky sued as part of a broader public debate over labor conditions
in Southeast Asia, Nike represented classic democratic self-
governance in action.36 There was no commercial transaction, and
Kasky did not allege that he was deceived into buying Nike's
products.37
A case similar to Nike is unlikely to reoccur, primarily because
after the lawsuit went to the Supreme Court, California changed its
law that had allowed private plaintiffs like Kasky to sue. In 2004,
California passed Proposition 64, which was aimed at rescinding
elements of California's Unfair Business Competition Law, the law
that Kasky used to sue Nike.3 California law now requires that a
person bringing suit under this Act must have actually sustained the
injury complained of in the suit.39 The law also states that only the
California Attorney General and local public officials may file
lawsuits on behalf of the citizens of the state.40 Although traditional
class action tools remain, the parts of the law that allowed Kasky to
bring his lawsuit were eliminated.4' Consequently, a future Kasky
will have to assert in some realistic way that he or she purchased a
product or service based on a representation about that product or
service, such as its qualities, as opposed to something amorphous,
such as the company being a "good corporate citizen.
42
33. Id. at 250, 262.
34. Id. at 265 (Chin, J., dissenting).
35. 463 U.S. 60, 62 (1983).
36. See Nike, 45 P.3d at 266 (Chin, J., dissenting).
37. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 656, 667 (2003).
38. See Carolyn Said, Proposition 64: Citizens' Right to Sue Limited, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 4,
2004, at C 1; Evan Pondel, Baiting the Hook: Prop. 64 on the November Ballot Has Businesses
and Consumers Divided, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Aug. 15, 2004, at B 1.
39. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (Deering 2007).
40. Id.
41. Id.; see also Said, supra note 38, at Cl.
42. See § 17200; see also Nike, 539 U.S. at 657.
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II. INDETERMINACY OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
When it comes to the First Amendment and issues of political
self-governance, the indeterminacy of the commercial speech test
affects both the plaintiff and the defendant.43 Plaintiffs such as Kasky
must first be able to claim with straight faces that they purchased
products based on the belief that they were made under good
working conditions in Southeast Asia, and then they must be able to
prove that claim to a jury.'
By contrast, a commercial defendant has little interest in self-
governance issues.45 When my clients ask for advice regarding the
Nike-type risk inherent in any marketing campaign, I sometimes cite
Judge Leval, discussing a fair use case that went up and down the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals: "It has been exhilarating to find
myself present at the cutting edge of the law, even though in the role
of the salami. ' 46 And I have turned to my client and said, "This is all
very interesting; so how would you like to be the salami?" They are
not particularly interested. Ultimately, the commercial actors are not
interested in pursuing the broader ideological issues of self-
governance-they would rather move on to the next sale than defend
their last advertising campaign. So much for the so-called
"hardiness" of commercial speech. 7
A. Development of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
The indeterminacy of the commercial speech doctrine is a
reflection of two models of First Amendment thinking.48 First, there
is the marketplace model.49 That model is best exemplified by
Justice Thomas, who is the most pro-First Amendment justice on the
43. See, e.g., Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 270-80 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., dissenting).
44. See generally Nike, 539 U.S. at 667 (noting that the plaintiff may have had difficulty
establishing an "injury in fact" that was "fairly traceable" to the actions of the defendant).
45. See generally James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First
Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1100-06
(2003) (discussing self-governance).
46. Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use or Foul? The Nineteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture,
36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 167, 168 (1989).
47. Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-
72 n.24.
48. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564,
592 (1980).
49. Id. at 592.
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Court, especially when the case involves commercial speech. 0
Second, there is the regulatory model, best epitomized by Justice
Breyer, which is concerned with controlling the commercial
marketplace." A combination of protectionism and how the guild
mentality would eventually transform itself dictates who will enter or
not enter a profession, and who will be allowed to advertise and who
will not. So, the development of the commercial speech doctrine
reflects the changes in models of economic regulation, moving from
a New Deal-based government regulation system to a system based
more on free markets and deregulation. 2
The Supreme Court built the commercial speech doctrine
primarily over the past thirty years. The result has been a four-part
test from Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service
Commission of New York53 that looks intriguing at the appellate level
and to academics who write law review articles, but is very difficult
to prove at the trial court level. 4
Consequently, the case law varies from case to case in ways that
make utterly no sense.5 For example, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliott, Inc. 6 dealt with whether the government had the right to
force assessments on fruit growers, handlers, and processors for the
cost of generic advertising for California nectarines, plums, and
peaches. 7 The Supreme Court held that the assessments did not
violate the First Amendment. 8 Four years later, in United States v.
50. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 487 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
51. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737
(1996). See generally Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-66 (discussing commercial speech and
regulation).
52. Reza R. Dibadj, The Political Economy of Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 913,
922-24 (2007). It was, likely, no accident that the first major recognition of commercial speech
constitutional rights by the Supreme Court, in the mid-1970s, coincided with the Carter
administration's first efforts to deregulate air travel, trucking, and other sectors of the American
economy. See, e.g., id. at 923.
53. 447 U.S. at 556.
54. See, e.g., Note, Dissent, Corporate Cartels, and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1898-99 (2007).
55. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 6, at 628, 631.
56. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
57. Id. at 460.
58. See id. at 477.
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United Foods, Inc.," a case involving assessments to pay for generic
advertisements for mushrooms, the Court held that the government
had no right to force these assessments.6"
Those of us who practice law every day are trying to make sense
of this case law. We are unable to explain why the courts reached
opposite holdings. What distinction would call for regulation of
plums and peaches on the one hand, but reject regulation for
mushrooms on the other.61 Indeed, some of the observers of the legal
arguments presented in the Glickman case concluded that the poor
quality of oral arguments must have contributed to the decision.62
And yet, should our legal doctrine stand on those types of
uncertainties and vagaries?
These contradictions are reflected in two cases decided by Judge
Chin of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. World Wrestling Federation Entertainment, Inc. v.
Bozel 63 involved a motion to dismiss by the Parents Television
Council ("PTC"), which was engaged in a campaign against the
World Wrestling Federation ("WWF") stemming from what the PTC
believed was excessive violence in WWF programming.' PTC's
goal was to educate its members-and WWF's sponsors and
advertisers-to the purported fact that WWF and its program WWF
SMACKDOWN! were responsible for the deaths of four children.65
59. 533 U.S. 405, 408 (2001).
60. Id. at 417. The Court contrasted the advertising program at issue here with the
advertising program in Glickman: "In Glickman the mandated assessments for speech were
ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy. Here, for all
practical purposes, the advertising itself, far from being ancillary, is the principal object of the
regulatory scheme." Id. at 411-12; see Glickman, 521 U.S. at 470.
61. See Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right Against Compelled
Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2005).
62. See Tony Mauro, Appealing Practice: The Supply of High Court Cases Is Shrinking-but
the Demand for a Piece of That Prestigious Docket Has Never Been More Fierce, AM. LAW.,
Oct. 2000, at 80, 83-84. It is possible that the Glickman oral argument presented by the
challengers to the regulations was among the worst in modem Supreme Court history. At one
point, the attorney, Thomas Campagne, speculated "that Scalia wouldn't buy green plums
because 'you don't want to give your wife diarrhea."' Id. at 84. Indeed, attorney malpractice
claims were later brought as a result of the disastrous argument. Id. Finally, in Gerawan
Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 12 P.3d 720, 725 (Cal. 2000), presumably with different counsel
presenting the argument, the California Supreme Court reached a contrary result for some of the
same litigants under the California constitution.
63. 142 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
64. Id. at520-21.
65. Id. at 521.
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The WWF brought thirteen causes of action against the PTC,
including trademark dilution, unfair competition, copyright
infringement, and trade libel.66 The allegedly defamatory statements
fell into two categories: (1) statements asserting that WWF and its
programs were responsible for the deaths of the four children; and
(2) statements misrepresenting the number of corporate sponsors and
advertisers who had withdrawn their support for WWF
SMACKDOWN!.67 Judge Chin concluded that the speech at issue
was commercial speech.68 Yet, nowhere in his opinion did he make
reference to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,69 which dealt with a
similar fundraising appeal in an advertisement.7"
More recently, in Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc.,7 Judge
Chin decided another commercial speech case, dealing with claims
against the promoters of the Atkins Diet. The plaintiff, a man who
went on the diet and subsequently suffered major heart disease, sued
for products liability, negligent misrepresentation, and deceptive
conduct.72 The plaintiff claimed he would never have followed the
diet if the defendants had not misled him into believing that medical
warnings by the American Heart Association and others were false.7 3
Nevertheless, Judge Chin held that the defendants' speech was
protected by the First Amendment.74
On the ground level, these decisions make little sense because
they are so divergent. The cases lack a consistent doctrine
identifying the facts that must be proven in order to establish either
liability or absolute First Amendment protection.
66. Id. at 522.
67. Id. at 521.
68. Id. at 525.
69. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
70. In New York Times v. Sullivan, the plaintiff claimed he was libeled by statements in a
full-page advertisement that ran in The New York Times, entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices."
The advertisement claimed that the efforts of African-American students to engage in non-violent
protest in support of their constitutional rights were "being met by an unprecedented wave of
terror by those who would deny and negate that document which the whole world looks upon as
setting the pattern for modern freedom." Id. at 256.
71. 464 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 322.
74. Id. at 327-28.
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B. Conflation of Commercial Speech and Commercial Use
The indeterminacy of the commercial speech doctrine surfaces
in private causes of action in odd ways, such as in tort claims of
misappropriation, right of publicity claims, statutory claims under
trademark law and the Lanham Act, and even certain claims arising
under copyright laws and the fair use doctrine.75 Much of this
confusion stems from the fact that these claims turn on the notion of
''commercial use," and the courts have started to conflate the notion
of "commercial use" with "commercial speech."76 The net result is
an incoherent set of laws that often turn on small factual distinctions.
For instance, Hoffman v. Capital Cities" involved a lawsuit
brought by actor Dustin Hoffman against Los Angeles Magazine for
an alleged violation of common law and California state right of
publicity, unfair competition under California law, and the federal
Lanham Act.7 The magazine had taken a picture of Hoffman from
the movie Tootsie, 9 in which Hoffman played a male actor dressing
as a woman, and used computer technology to alter the film image to
portray Hoffman wearing different clothing."0 The photograph was
part of a series that used stills from familiar movie scenes and
modified them to showcase spring fashions.8"
The district court held that the fashion section was an
''exploitative commercial use" and was therefore not entitled to full
First Amendment protection. 2  The Ninth Circuit disagreed.83
Hoffman pointed out that the Tootsie photograph was altered to show
him wearing Ralph Lauren shoes, there was a Ralph Lauren
advertisement elsewhere in the magazine, and the magazine included
a "Shopper's Guide" that provided store names and price
75. See generally Ann K. Wooster, Protection of Commercial Speech Under First
Amendment-Supreme Court Cases, 164 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2000) (citing a variety of commercial
speech causes of action).
76. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002); see also
Hoffman v. Capital Cities, 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001).
77. 255 F.3d 1180.
78. Id. at 1183.
79. TOOTSIE (Columbia Pictures Corp. et al. 1982).
80. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1183.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1184.
83. Id. at 1189.
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information.84 Nevertheless, the court ruled that those facts were
insufficient to make the photograph "pure commercial" speech.8"
The court observed that the magazine did not use Hoffman's image
in a traditional advertisement printed merely to sell a product, and
the magazine did not receive any consideration for featuring the
designers' clothes.86 The article also did not advance a commercial
message:
It is a complement to and a part of the issue's focus on
Hollywood past and present. Viewed in context, the article
as a whole is a combination of fashion photography, humor,
and visual and verbal editorial comment on classic films
and famous actors. Any commercial aspects are
"inextricably entwined" with expressive elements, and so
they cannot be separated out "from the fully protected
whole."87
This decision contrasts with another decision made by the Ninth
Circuit, Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch,88 where the retailer used
old photographs of surfers taken at a surfing championship in an
advertising campaign with a surfing theme.89 The individuals in the
photograph sued, claiming that Abercrombie had misappropriated
their names and likenesses in violation of California's common law
and statutory prohibition against misappropriation and the Lanham
Act.9" They also brought claims of negligence and defamation.9' The
retailer argued, and the district court agreed, that the advertisements
were protected under the First Amendment.92
On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit held that the First
Amendment did not shield the retailer because the use of the
photograph did not contribute significantly to the public interest;
thus, the relationship between the photograph and the surfing theme
84. Id. at 1185.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc'y v. City & County of San Francisco, 952 F.2d
1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1990)).
88. 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001).
89. Id. at 999-1000.
90. Id. at 1000.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1001.
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was too tenuous.93 In a footnote, the court also distinguished its
holding in Hoffman.94 The court explained that in Hoffman, the
magazine had featured the clothing of designers but had received no
consideration for doing so, whereas in the present case, the clothing
designer had used the photograph to promote its own clothing. 95
Two lawsuits involving The Beardstown Ladies' Common-Sense
Investment Guide9 6 also reached contradictory results97-even though
the facts were identical.98 The book is about sixteen women who
formed an investment club that claimed a ten-year average
investment return of 23.4 percent.99 In Keimer v. Buena Vista Books,
Inc.,' ° a lawsuit brought in California, the plaintiff filed suit for
claims of false advertising and unfair business practices because the
actual rate of return was 9.1 percent, rather than the advertised rate of
23.4 percent."0 ' In Lacoff v. Buena Vista Publishing,1 2 the plaintiffs
brought suit in a New York state court, alleging violations of New
York state's deceptive trade practices and false advertising laws, as
well as common-law fraud and unjust enrichment.0 3 They claimed
that they were induced to buy the book on the basis of the return rate
and that the book would provide investment "secrets."'
0 4
In both cases, the courts considered whether the book was
commercial speech, and thus entitled to less protection under the
First Amendment.0 5 In the California case, the court effectively
severed the book and videotape from their covers and held that
93. Id. at 1002.
94. Id. at 1002 n.2 (citing Hoffman v. Capital Cities, 255 F.3d 1180, 1189-90 (9th Cir.
2001)).
95. Id.
96. BEARDSTOWN LADIES INVESTMENT CLUB WITH LESLIE WHITAKER, THE BEARDSTOWN
LADIES' COMMON-SENSE INVESTMENT GUIDE: How WE BEAT THE STOCK MARKET-AND
How You CAN, Too (1996).
97. Compare Keimer v. Buena Vista Books, Inc., 75 Cal. App. 4th 1220, 1233 (1999), with
Lacoffv. Buena Vista Publ'g, Inc., 705 N.Y.S.2d 183, 191-193 (App. Div. 2000).
98. Compare Keimer, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 1223-25, with Lacoff, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
99. Keimer, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 1223-24; Lacoff, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
100. 75 Cal. App. 4th 1220.
101. Id. at 1224.
102. 705 N.Y.S.2d 183.
103. Id. at 186-87.
104. Id. at 186.
105. Keimer, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 1230; Lacoff, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 188-90.
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statements made on the covers were commercial speech."°6 The court
reached this conclusion by stating that book covers are
advertisements and the advertisements referred to a specific
product-the book or videotape." 7  "It is true, of course, that the
subject matter of the books-achieving economic security by
investing-is of interest to the general public. However, speech can
be considered commercial even though it contains information which
enables the public to cope with the exigencies of their period."'0 8
By contrast, in the New York case, the court held that the book
was not commercial speech because the speech was not designed to
sell a product, and the fact that those items were sold for profit was
not enough to make it commercial speech.' ° "The main purpose of
the work is to tell the story of the Beardstown Ladies, to educate as
to investment clubs and the Beardstown Ladies' investment strategy,
and to entertain.""'  The court acknowledged the California court's
holding, but stated flatly that "it finds otherwise.'''
These two cases involved the same book, the same
representations, and the same advertising blurb on the cover." 2
Nevertheless, the cases produced opposite results, with the New
York court dismissing the case on First Amendment grounds and the
California court allowing the case to proceed."3
The same contradiction can be seen in a pair of lawsuits
involving comic books. In Doe v. McFarlane,"4 a former ice hockey
player named Tony Twist brought suit against Todd McFarlane, the
creator of the successful Spawn comic book series."5 McFarlane had
developed a character named "Antonio Twistelli," a mafia boss, and
had named the character after Twist, the former hockey player."
16
106. Keimer, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 1230.
107. Id. at 1229.
108. Id. at 1229-30 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 n.15
(1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Lacoff 705 N.Y.S.2d at 190.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 191.
112. Compare Keimer, 75 Cal. App. 4th passim, with Lacoff, 705 N.Y.S.2d passim. I should
note, for the record, that my law firm represented the publishers in the New York case.
113. CompareLacoff, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 187, with Keimer, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 1233.
114. 207 S.W.3d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
115. Id. at 56.
116. Id.
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Twist brought claims of misappropriation."7 A Missouri appellate
court held that the comic book figure was commercial speech
because the predominant purpose of using the name "Tony Twist"
was to sell comic books and related products, not for expressive
comment about Twist the hockey player."8
However, in Winter v. DC Comics,"9 the California Supreme
Court held that comic books containing characters resembling two
well-known performing and recording musicians, Johnny and Edgar
Winter, were entitled to full First Amendment protection.'20 The
Winter brothers claimed two characters in the comic strip--two giant
worm-like creatures that were singing cowboys-violated their right
of publicity. 2' The court disagreed and ruled that the comic book
creatures were transformative, and that the creatures were "fanciful,
creative characters, not pictures of the Winter brothers. This makes
all the difference. The comic books here are entitled to First
Amendment protection.'
' 2
There is no way one can reconcile these two rulings. Comic
books that contain characters resembling well-known figures are
either entitled or not entitled to First Amendment protections. The
speech is either commercial or not commercial. The California
court's ruling is all the more remarkable in light of the debate over
Nike and whether the speech there was "commercial speech."' 123 To
quote Dave Kohler, a thoughtful and well-regarded Southwestern
Law School professor and former First Amendment lawyer for CNN:
Something is wrong when the First Amendment can be
interpreted to offer more protection to a comic book
featuring worm-like creatures inspired by famous albino
rock stars than to a letter to the editor debating the working
conditions in Southeast Asian factories. But this is
precisely the strange state of affairs wrought by two
decisions of the California Supreme Court considering how
117. Id.
118. Id. at 61.
119. 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
120. Id. at 476.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 480.
123. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 657 (2003).
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the commercial nature of a message should be factored into
the constitutional equation. 1
24
This is a body of constitutional law that I, as a practitioner,
encounter on a regular basis. The level of doctrinal incoherence at
the trial court level is amazing because although major constitutional
rights are implicated, we premise these private causes of action on
this uncertain distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech.15  The cases simply do not make sense in the ordinary
context, and there is no way to explain two absolutely divergent
results involving the same book. One cannot match up the
Beardstown Ladies book on one coast with the same book on the
other coast and discover two absolutely divergent results.
The fact that the speech involves selling products is not
dispositive. In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc. 126 Tiger
Woods's licensing company brought suit against the publisher of
artwork that depicted Woods's victory at the Masters Tournament in
Augusta, Georgia. 27  ETW filed suit alleging trademark
infringement, unfair competition, and violation of Woods's right of
publicity.2 8 The defendant essentially claimed that the artwork was
expression protected by the First Amendment. 29 The court held that
the artwork was not commercial speech, concluding that the prints
"do not propose a commercial transaction. Accordingly, they are
entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment."' 3 ° The court
reached this conclusion even though the product was a commercial
product-a picture of Tiger Woods.'
By contrast, in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup,
Inc.,"'32 the California Supreme Court held that lithographs and
124. David Kohler, At the Intersection of Comic Books and Third World Working Conditions:
Is It Time to Re-Examine the Role of Commercial Interests in the Regulation of Expression?, 28
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 145, 145-46 (2006).
125. Id.
126. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that even speech carried in a form that is sold for
profit is protected).
127. Id. at918.
128. Id. at 919.
129. Id. at 924.
130. Id. at 925.
131. Id. at918, 925.
132. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
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t-shirts that bore a resemblance to the Three Stooges were not
protected by the First Amendment. 33 After reviewing the works, the
court found that Saderup's works violated the plaintiffs right of
publicity because the pictures were not sufficiently transformative.'
4
Without substantial changes from the original works, the court found
that literal, conventional depictions of celebrities like the Three
Stooges would not be protected by the First Amendment.'35
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is going through a seismic doctrinal shift
that now recognizes the self-expression rights of the corporate entity.
The early commercial speech cases did not consider the interests of
the commercial speaker at all.'36 Instead, the decisions turned on the
interests of the audience.'37 In its more recent rulings, however, such
as Thompson v. Western States Medical Center'38 and Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,'39 the Court has suddenly begun discussing the
commercial speaker's autonomous self-expression rights.
This is a marked departure from the earlier cases. The Court
appears to be protecting advertisers who sit down with their
corporate boards to decide how best to position themselves in the
commercial world. This was the very type of speech at issue in
Nike. 41 Consequently, these recent cases suggest that the type of
speech at issue in Nike may be speech that the Supreme Court is
willing to protect.
The early years of the Supreme Court's commercial speech
jurisprudence involved dismantling unnecessary, and frequently
arbitrary and absurd, government regulations of speech. Beginning
133. Id. at 799-800.
134. Id. at 810-11.
135. Id.
136. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942).
137. By contrast, in noncommercial First Amendment cases, the Court is primarily concerned
with the intent of the speaker. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see
also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S.
1 (1949).
138. 535 U.S. 357, 376-77 (2002) (holding as unconstitutional the prohibition of useful
speech, such as pharmacists' relaying of alternative drug treatment possibilities to doctors).
139. 533 U.S. 525, 590 (2001) (holding that cigarette advertisements, regardless of their
potential for causing harm, are entitled to First Amendment protection).
140. 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
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with Nike, the niceties of the commercial speech doctrine are
increasingly the focus of litigation between two private parties. A
three- or four-part test, which may be appropriate in evaluating a
declaratory judgment involving a governmental entity, creates
uncertainty in ordinary litigation.
The question thus becomes: What steps can the courts take to
rectify the case law and eliminate these litigation risks?
First, if commercial speech is granted less protection than other
forms of expression, a bright-line definition should be adopted. This
definition should be clear, understandable, and cognizant that the
burden of proof should be placed on those who seek to penalize
communications.
Second, this commercial speech test should focus on purely
transactional speech and communication. Extending commercial
speech rules beyond the transactional context sweeps too broadly
into protected expression and can create a "chilling" effect on
commercial speakers.
In a recent decision, White v. City of Sparks,4' the Ninth Circuit
crystallized this approach. At issue was a Nevada municipal
regulation prohibiting the sale of merchandise in city parks without
prior approval.'42 The plaintiff challenged this rule, claiming it
interfered with his First Amendment right to sell the "nature scenes"
he created outdoors in the city's parks and on its sidewalks.'43
Attempting to justify its regulation, the city claimed that the artist's
sale of his original paintings removed them "from the ambit of
protected expression."'44  The Court held commercial speech is
"speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial
transaction.""45  The decision disposed of the commercial speech
argument in a single sentence. The artist's paintings, "which
communicate his vision of the sanctity of nature, do more than
141. 500 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2007).
142. Id. at 954.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 956.
145. Id. at 957 (quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
Fall 2007]
314 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:297
propose a commercial transaction and therefore are not commercial
speech."
46
Third, an appropriate definition of commercial speech should
not be premised on the "motivation" or "motive" of the speaker.
Does the fact that I am a practicing lawyer while a majority of the
other symposium participants are law school professors mean that
my analysis of the same constitutional issues is entitled to less First
Amendment protection? Does the fact that I am a co-author of a
major treatise on commercial speech, and thus presumably eager to
sell books, place my views in a lower category of speech? Yet, some
courts assume that the desire to earn money or to earn a living
justifies slapping the commercial speech label on that speaker's
efforts to communicate. Adopting such a rationale, in effect, would
eliminate vital contributions by knowledgeable speakers and allow
Dr. Johnson's "blockhead[s]"'' 47 to dominate discussion.
Fourth, any commercial speech test must be applied across the
board, without regard to ideology. Otherwise, the risks highlighted
by Judge Kozinski and Professor Banner many years ago will remain
with us. 4 And the definition must apply equally to Nike and to the
Communications Workers of America.
149
Finally, why should speech prompted by commercial interests
be afforded less protection than speech prompted by religious
zealotry, racial bigotry, blind partisanship, ideological stubbornness,
or a rigid refusal to acknowledge the precepts of the "reality-based
community"? 5 ° Indeed, in the United States, as Justice Alito
recognized many years ago, a largely commercial media is
sometimes dependent on advertising dollars to survive.' In many
146. Id.
147. Samuel Johnson, quoted in 6 BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON 309 (George Birkbeck Hill
ed., Macmillan & Co. 1887) ("No man but a blockhead ever wrote except for money .....
148. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 6, at 652-53.
149. Compare Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (2002) (commercial speech pertaining to
a large manufacturer of athletic shoes and apparel), with Aitken v. Commc'ns Workers of Am.,
496 F. Supp. 2d 653 (E.D. Va. 2007) (commercial speech pertaining to pro-union activity within
a company).
150. Ron Suskind, Without a Doubt, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 17, 2004, at 51 (discussing a
presidential senior aide's categorization of those who study reality for solutions, as opposed to the
White House imperative to "create [its] own reality").
151. See Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 105-06 (3rd Cir. 2004) (holding that advertising
for alcoholic beverages by school-affiliated media was protected by the First Amendment).
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cases, extending the commercial speech doctrine too far imperils
fully-protected expression.
In conclusion, modem commercial speech doctrine remains
unsettled and, at the trial court level, very uncertain. Consistency
would be welcomed because uncertainty here is a deterrent to
freedom of expression, even by commercial speakers. A rigorous
application of current commercial speech principles, limiting
commercial speech to purely transactional speech, would go a long
way toward leveling the playing field between those with
commercial motivations and everyone else.' 2
152. See Bruce E.H. Johnson & Jeffrey L. Fisher, Why Format, Not Content, Is the Key to
Identifying Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1243, 1245, 1253-55 (2004) (arguing
that commercial speech should not all be subject to one standard, but regulated based on format
rather than content).
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